Hero Image
OpenResty + Redis: Block High-Frequency IPs

OpenResty + Redis: Block High-Frequency IPs init_by_lua_block { redis = require "redis" client = redis.connect('127.0.0.1', 6379) } server { listen 8080; location / { access_by_lua_file /usr/local/nginx/conf/lua/block.lua; proxy_pass http://192.168.1.102:8000; } } -- Redis-based IP rate limiting / blocking for OpenResty (ngx_lua) -- NOTE: -- This script assumes a global `client` variable is used/stored. -- Make sure `redis` module is available and `client` is initialized somewhere. local function isConnected() return client:ping() end local function createRedisConnection() return redis.connect("127.0.0.1", 6379) end -- If the Redis connection fails, stop blocking (allow traffic) if pcall(isConnected) then -- already connected (or ping succeeded) else -- not connected; try reconnect if pcall(createRedisConnection) then -- Reconnect: this will reconnect Redis on every request -- For high traffic, consider disabling reconnect (skip pcall), and allow/terminate directly via ngx.exit client = createRedisConnection() else ngx.exit(ngx.OK) end end local ttl = 60 -- sampling window (seconds) local bktimes = 30 -- requests within window to trigger block local block_ttl = 600 -- block duration after trigger (seconds) local ip = ngx.var.remote_addr local ipvtimes = client:get(ip) if ipvtimes then if ipvtimes == "-1" then -- blocked return ngx.exit(403) else local last_ttl = client:ttl(ip) -- ngx.say("key exist.ttl is ", last_ttl) if last_ttl == -1 then client:set(ip, 0) client:expire(ip, ttl) -- ngx.say("ttl & vtimes recount") return ngx.exit(ngx.OK) end local vtimes = tonumber(client:get(ip)) + 1 if vtimes < bktimes then client:set(ip, vtimes) client:expire(ip, last_ttl) -- ngx.say(ip, " view ", vtimes, " times") return ngx.exit(ngx.OK) else -- ngx.say(ip, " will be block next time.") client:set(ip, -1) client:expire(ip, block_ttl) return ngx.exit(ngx.OK) end end else -- key does not exist client:set(ip, 1) -- ngx.say(ip, " view 1 times") client:expire(ip, ttl) return ngx.exit(ngx.OK) end

Hero Image
設定 Haproxy 以防止 DDOS 攻擊

設定 Haproxy 以防止 DDOS 攻擊 TCP syn flood attacks vi /etc/sysctl.conf # Protection from SYN flood net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 1024 Slowloris like attacks defaults option http-server-close timeout http-request 5s timeout connect 5s timeout client 30s timeout server 10s timeout tunnel 1h 限制每一個 user 的連線數量 普通用戶瀏覽網站的網頁,或是從網站下載東西時,瀏覽器一般會建立 5-7 個 TCP 鏈接。當一個惡意 client 打開了大量 TCP 連線時,耗費大量資源,因此我們必須要限制同一個用戶的連線數量。 但如果有很多使用者,是從某一個私有網段,透過 NAT 的方式連線到 Server 時,且實際上我們也不知道,到底哪一個會是 NAT 的轉址後的 IP,不知道該將哪個 IP 設定為白名單,這樣的限制就會造成問題,因此我們認為實際的環境,這樣的設定應該要保留不處理。 以下是一個設定的範例,最重要的地方是在 frontend ft_web 區塊的設定。 global stats socket ./haproxy.stats level admin defaults option http-server-close mode http timeout http-request 5s timeout connect 5s timeout server 10s timeout client 30s listen stats bind 0.0.0.0:8880 stats enable stats hide-version stats uri / stats realm HAProxy Statistics stats auth admin:admin frontend ft_web bind 0.0.0.0:8080 # Table definition stick-table type ip size 100k expire 30s store conn_cur # Allow clean known IPs to bypass the filter tcp-request connection accept if { src -f /etc/haproxy/whitelist.lst } # Shut the new connection as long as the client has already 10 opened tcp-request connection reject if { src_conn_cur ge 10 } tcp-request connection track-sc1 src # Split static and dynamic traffic since these requests have different impacts on the servers use_backend bk_web_static if { path_end .jpg .png .gif .css .js } default_backend bk_web # Dynamic part of the application backend bk_web balance roundrobin cookie MYSRV insert indirect nocache server srv1 192.168.1.2:80 check cookie srv1 maxconn 100 server srv2 192.168.1.3:80 check cookie srv2 maxconn 100 # Static objects backend bk_web_static balance roundrobin server srv1 192.168.1.2:80 check maxconn 1000 server srv2 192.168.1.3:80 check maxconn 1000 限制每個 user 產生新連線的速率 Limiting the connection rate per user 惡意的使用者會在短時間內建立很多連線,但如果產生新連線的速度太高,就會消耗掉過多的資源服務一個使用者。